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Juan Ramón Fallada García-Valle, Tarragona / Spain 
 
Technocracy Inside the Rule of Law. 
Challenges in the Foundations of Legal Norms 
 
Abstract: Technocracy is usually opposed to democracy. Here, another perspective is taken: 
technocracy is  countered with the rule of  law. In trying  to  understand the contemporary 
dynamics of the rule of law, two main types of legal systems (in a broad sense) have to be 
distinguished: firstly, the legal norm, studied by the science of law; secondly, the scientific 
laws  (which includes  the legalities of  the different  sciences  and  communities). They both 
contain normative prescriptions. But their differ in their subjects‘ source: while legal norms 
are the will’s expression of the normative authority, technical prescriptions can be derived 
from  scientific  laws,  which  are  grounded  over  the  commonly  supposed  objectivity  of  the 
scientific knowledge about reality. They both impose sanctions too, but in the legal norm they 
refer to what is established by the norm itself, while in the scientific legality they consist in the 
reward or the punishment derived from the efficacy or inefficacy to reach the end pursued by 
the action. The way of legitimation also differs: while legal norms have to have followed the 
formal procedures and must not have contravened any fundamental right, technical norms‘ 
validity  depend  on  its  theoretical  foundations  or  on  its  efficacy.  Nowadays,  scientific 
knowledge  has  become  and  important  feature  in  policy-making.  Contradictions  can  arise 
between these legal systems. These conflicts  are specially grave when the recognition  or 
exercise of fundamental rights is instrumentally used, or when they are violated in order to 
increase  the  policies‘  efficacy.  A  political  system  is  technocratic,  when,  in  case  of 
contradiction, the scientific law finally prevails. 
Keywords: Technocracy, rule of law, fundamental rights, structure of the norms, efficiency 
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I. Submission of the question  
At present, it has been attributed to scientific knowledge a fundamental role in explaining the 
social and political changes that contemporary societies suffer. The prevailing discourse is 
that the best possible policy decisions, if not the only viable, is to adapt and, even better, to 
anticipate to those changes that are caused by forces which are beyond human control. But 
those connections between technological change and social change have a history. Following 
Echeverría (2003) and Sanz (2008), two crucial moments can be highlighted.  
 
The first one began with the so-called Vannevar Bush Report, after the end of the World 
War  Two.  Although  other  proposals  finally  prevailed  over  that  of  Bush  (Dennis,  2006; 
Greenberg, 2001: 41-51), it was from his report that permanent relations in peace times (or 
Cold War) between the state and the scientific community were established. It is at this time 
when scientific research permanently oriented its activity to other purposes than those strictly 
epistemic, in exchange for funding, among other demands . During the beginnings, most of 
the projects promoted had a military goal. Nowadays, the objectives are wider (Lakoff, 2001). 
Although  those  projects  were  by  themselves  highly  expensive  and  uneconomical,  they 
provided the scientific knowledge necessary for later profit-earning research lines . But in the 
meanwhile,  public  initiative  and  investment  was  predominant.  In  this  context,  science 
continued to be perceived as an activity apart from society.  
 
The socialisation of science took place in the late 60's and early 70's of the XXth century, 
when technological innovation came to be considered the decisive factor in economic growth 
and,  by  extension,  in  the  transformations  of  social  reality  (Castells,  2003:  116-118;  Bell, 
[1973] 1999: 192-193) . From that moment on, science and technological innovation have not 
only been the source for the production of new consumer products, but the very foundation of 
economic development and social welfare. It was then when society began to realise the key 
role  of  science  in  social  life.  As  a  result  of  this  shift  on  the  paradigm  and  the  fact  that 
investment  in  scientific  research  and  technological  development  was  already  profitable 
enterprises incorporated research and development departments and States promoted scientific 
and technological development for economic purposes, both in the public and private sphere. 
“Big science” of huge governmental projects are since then combined with private initiatives 
of “technoscience” .   
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In the same decades in which people was getting conscious of the critical role of science 
and technology in the economy and society, a controversy arose, marked by the increasing 
modernisation  of  both  the  public  and  the  private  administration,  about  the  desirability  of 
adapting social structures and policies to the needs of this new source of economic progress. 
The privileged position enjoyed by science as an objective source of knowledge was reflected 
by the incorporation of technicians trained in scientific fields considered of public interest, in 
order to advise or participate in decision-making processes. This led to the discussion around 
the contrast between technocracy and democracy (Maasen and Weingart, 2005). In its centre, 
there was the question about whether the expert should hold political power or not, because 
of, on the one hand, the knowledge they possess, but on the other hand, its lack of democratic 
legitimacy and of public accountability of their activities. The belief in the objectivity of 
scientific  knowledge  was  the  key  element  of  the  arguments  of  those  who  argued  the 
desirability of a government of experts (Fischer 1990). This discourse is articulated in two 
basic ideas. First, the objectivity of knowledge and lack of personal motivation would qualify 
the expert to make decisions. Second, the lack of expert knowledge of the population and 
their biased motivations would disqualify them to make decisions, and to exert some control 
over those who qualified to take them, too. 
 
Finally, during the 1960's and the 1970's took place one last crucial change: the belief 
that science could not be the cause of social harm fell down (de la Mothe, 2001: 6). First, 
people began to be aware that it was impossible to foresee the possible consequences of the 
technological  innovation's  implementation  (Beck,  2006:  288-290;  Jasanoff,  1995:  69-92). 
This will call into question the myth of the uniqueness of valid alternatives; especially in 
situations of uncertainty, it is impossible to evaluate the goodness of the various alternatives. 
Secondly, epistemology began to question in depth the objectivity of scientific knowledge. It 
was precisely when epistemologists became aware of the social and political use of science, 
that belief in the objectivity of scientific knowledge was questioned. Along that stream, but 
without falling into relativism, Kuhn ([1969] 2007) grounded his theory in the existence of 
many scientific communities, which would differ in their positions and their responses to the 
challenges  posed by an ever-changing reality.  Against the belief in  the objectivity of the 
scientists, his work emphasised the fact of their belonging to a specific community, defined 
by its support of a particular paradigm, and the influence of the academic background in 
scientific research. 
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Having assumed those criticisms, a new academic current has emerged  which maintains 
that  the  dispute  between  democracy  and  technocracy  would  have  lost  in  intensity:  since 
experts' decisions cannot guarantee the goodness of all its consequences and, in addition, are 
based on a knowledge whose objectivity is questioned, those decisions can and should be 
subject to public criticism and control. However, it is worth making explicit that, despite the 
fact that the objectivity and impartiality of the policies adopted by the experts is discredited, 
experts are still requested. What has happened is that the debate between democracy and 
technocracy has also been redefined: now the emphasis is on how to structure the decision 
making  process  to  attend  both  expert  bodies  and  democratic  representation  (Massen  and 
Weingart, 2005; Cozzens and Woodhouse, 1995). 
 
But on this last point I disagree both with the new approach and with the assumptions 
underlying  it.  My  basic  criticism  would  be  summarised  as  follows:  if  it  is  true  that  this 
supposed objectivity of  scientific knowledge has  been rightly called into question, in  my 
opinion the scope of these investigations has been largely restricted to the small circle of 
people who could have had interest in that subject. In regard to people without knowledge in 
epistemology, the myth of science as objective knowledge remains basically intact. The claim 
that what has fallen after the 1970's is, if anything, the aura of scientists' objectivity and 
disinterest, but not of science, seems a more realistic picture. The problem is seen to arise 
only when the scientist leaves the academic world and enters the realm of political activity; it 
is then, when suspicions about their motivations and interests can be put into question and, 
therefore, the neutrality of his proposals too. Thus, the participation of experts in decision 
making continues to bestow an aura of objective justification to the policies adopted, provided 
that the expert is not questioned.  
 
To  my  mind,  the  centre  of  the  controversy  does  not  lie  in  the  contrast  between 
technocracy and democracy. This is due, not to a neutralisation of the technocratic tendencies 
through a greater involvement of representative bodies, but because that debate misses the 
real issue. What the new epistemology has put into question is the myth of objectivity of 
science  in  itself,  bringing  useful  tools  to  describe  more  accurately  the  decision  making 
processes  involving  experts  as  well  as  the  ideological  component  inherent  to  scientific 
knowledge. Therefore, a democratic procedures of decision making are perfectly compatible 
with what has been called “technocracy”. The debate between democracy and technocracy, in 
which attention is paid to the procedure about how decisions are made and by whom, left in a  
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second place matters about which scientific paradigm dominates the decision-making, which 
has been the final result, and how these measures have been justified. If the perspective is 
changed and the analysis prioritises this second set of issues, then the terms of the dispute also 
vary: now, the dispute arisen is that between the rule of law and technocracy. That claim is 
specially  pressing  nowadays,  when  States  seem  to  have  lost  their  leading  position  in 
transforming society and seem to be compelled to adapt to the driving forces of financial 
markets. Curiously, that drift would have started from the 1970s onwards. In what follows, I 
try to present this approach. 
 
The focus must be directed, therefore, not only to decision-making procedures, but also 
to the the result, to the final content of the law, and whether fundamental rights are being cut 
and/or eroded and how those transgressions are justified. Nevertheless the more democratic 
roots in decision-making, that would just mean a relapse in the discourse of the necessity. 
What should be analysed, then, is that new form of legitimation of the law's content which can 
not be identified with any of the two great traditions, nor with non-positivism, neither with 
legal positivism. 
 
II. Scientific laws and legal norms  
1. The objective and the normative 
As just said, the starting point is that scientific knowledge is commonly understood by people 
who are not profane in epistemology as a form of objective knowledge. As Chalmers explains 
about the popular perception of science:  
 
«When it is claimed that science is special because it is based on the facts, the facts are 
presumed  to  be  claims  about  the  world  that  can  be  directly  established  by  a  careful, 
unprejudiced use of the senses. Science is to be based on what we can see, hear and touch 
rather than on personal opinions or speculative imaginings. If observation of the world is 
carried out in a careful, unprejudiced way the facts established in this way will constitute a 
secure, objective basis for science. If, further, reasoning that takes us from this factual basis to 
the  laws  and  theories  that  constitute  scientific  knowledge  is  sound,  then  the  resulting 
knowledge can itself be taken to be securely established and objective» (Chalmers, 1993: 1) .  
 
This  author  refers  to  this  conception  of  science  as  “common  view  inductivism” 
(Chalmers, 1993: 3). It is inductive because the source of knowledge lies on the observation  
6 
and scientific laws obtained by generalisation. It is objective because the observation is seen 
as unbiased. Similarly, one can speak of a kind of “common view deductivism”. It would be 
deductive because some concepts given to human reason serve as premises for new drawing 
conclusions that, ultimately, would attain to explain the object of study. And it is objective 
because  the  concepts  given  are  considered  free  of  subjectivism  and,  by  extension,  the 
inferences drawn. The term “common view conception of science” will be used to refer to 
both forms of ingenuity.  
 
The belief in the possibility of a radical separation between a subject and an object of 
knowledge is the common place for both forms of common view. If the subject is the knower, 
the object is what is known. Hence, we conclude that we can speak of scientific knowledge 
when the researcher observe and objectively generalises (common view inductivism), or when 
he intuits  intellectually  and analyses  objectively (common view deductivism).  It is  worth 
noting two implications of both ways of understanding the cognitive process: 1) knowledge 
consists in the construction of theories and the formulation of scientific laws by the subject of 
knowledge, 2) the paradigm of scientific activity lies in its objectivity, so that the resulting 
knowledge are, in turn, objective. Albeit knowledge is an idealisation of reality constructed by 
an individual and, in that sense, the scientist generates norms, that process of theories and 
laws' construction  should ideally not incorporate any subjective element, such as bias or 
personal values, but only adhere to the conclusions reached, inductively or deductively. To 
this end, the method becomes the key element to ensure the highest degree of objectivity of 
theories and scientific laws that scientists generate (Calsamiglia, 1986: 21-40). 
 
This  popular  belief  in  the  objectivity  of  scientific  knowledge  is  the  result  of  the 
popularisation and simplification of a long academic tradition. However, the study of that 
tradition is useful to understand those beliefs. The starting point of that tradition lies on its 
conception of scientific activity as a description of facts, be they empirical, normative or 
ideal.  All  these  types  of  events  have  in  common  that  they  fall  outside  the  subject  of 
knowledge, so it is up to the researcher to add nothing to the observation. The empirical facts 
refer to the different states of things in physical reality, which can be perceived by the people 
through their senses (even if some apparatus are used, which would not interfere with the 
possibility  of  objective  observation).  The  ideal  facts  refer  to  abstractions  not  empirically 
observable, but whose definition does not depend on the subject that seeks to explore its 
properties; theology or mathematics would be examples of this type of objective knowledge.  
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Finally, normative acts refer to the fact of the existence of rules that govern social relations. 
The science of law is an example of this type of science. Thus, laws of empirical science 
describe  relationships  between  empirical  facts,  while  deductive  sciences  describe 
relationships  between  ideal  concepts,  and  laws  of  the  normative  sciences  describe 
relationships between rules. The different nature of their object of knowledge also means that 
they differ in the type of relationships that each one set. While the empirical sciences would 
claim to determine causal relationships ("if it is A, then it is B"), deductive sciences would 
establish logical derivations between abstract concepts ("if P is P, then it follows that Q"), and 
normative sciences would be governed by the principle of imputation ("if it is X, then it must 
be Y"). The logical derivation relationship always provides necessary links between the two 
objects. The causal relationship can be understood as deterministic or as probabilistic. Finally, 
the relation of imputation in all case has a probabilistic character, since the assertion that from 
one fact must follow another, does not mean that it will actually happen .  
 
From  the  common  view  conception  of  science,  it  is  emphasised  that  the  work  of 
normative scientists is not to establish prescriptions , but to describe the existing ones and to 
relate them to clarify the underlying normative order. In the science of law, that work can be 
based on two different approaches: a non-positivist one, and a iuspositivist one.   
 
For  non-positivism,  the  science  of  law  is  both  a  normative  science  and  a  deductive 
science  (Alexy,  2010a)).  Therefore,  the  rules  comprising  the  legal  system  and  the 
relationships  established  between  them  are  characterised  by  the  features  of  both  types  of 
sciences. The legal norm not only expresses what should be, but also refers to what it is, as 
the duty to act in a certain way is established by the nature of the subject who must obey. A 
norm is always right because it is true. But its truth does not refer to any empirical fact, but to 
abstract ideal concepts about the nature of the human being, which makes a radical distinction 
from  the  empirical  sciences  .  His  nature  is  intended  to  be  described  in  his  normative 
dimension (Lee and George, 2008: 174-175; George, 1996: 321-322; Nozick ([1974] 1988: 
56-61). This duality is possible because the  source of that prescription is external to the 
subjects that must obey and hierarchically superior to them. Otherwise the requirement would 
result in a mere act of will of a fellow, with cognitive and volitional capacities similar to those 
who must obey, who could disagree on equal terms about the veracity and validity of the 
prescription in question. In conclusion, for those who must comply with the requirement, it  
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must be the product of an external and hierarchically superior body that knows the true nature 
of beings and, therefore, laws that should govern their activity. 
 
For iuspositivism, however, the legal rules are not the product of any superhuman will, or 
something inherent in the nature of things, but the expression of an act of human will. This 
implies the need to distinguish between normative sentences and legal norms (Kelsen, [1960] 
2009: 84-89), in order to preserve the descriptive character of the normative sciences. From 
this point of view, law maker and normative scientist must be clearly differentiated. While the 
first's function is to produce legal norms, the second's is to describe the legal system produced 
by the law maker.  
 
In the empirical sciences, by contrast, the sharp distinction between who describes and 
who prescribes has no sense, because of not having rules as its object of study. The distinction 
would be, in any case, between empirical facts and scientific laws. Therefore, the existence of 
some type of normativeness is not denied, as long as scientific laws are seen as abstractions of 
empirical  facts.  But  that  process  of  abstraction  would  be  sustained  on  facts  whose 
determination  does  not  depend  on  human  will.  And  since  the    foundation  of  technical 
standards refers to the normativeness of scientific laws  and not to the will of the expert, a 
sharp distinction cannot be maintained between the two figures of the empirical sciences, 
namely, the scientific (who describes) and the expert (who prescribes, but because of his 
scientific knowledge). In the next subsection, these comments will be further developed. 
 
According to the above, neither the laws of normative sciences, nor the laws of empirical 
sciences aim to regulate social life, but only to describe and explain the regularities of the 
natural or the social reality. This is what would distinguish them from the legal norms, which 
itself ultimately aim to regulate social life. Therefore, from the common view conception of 
science, the descriptive nature of science must be weighed against the normative nature of 
legal norms.  
 
2. On prescriptions 
As is known, the distinction static and dynamic normative systems have been made within the 
philosophy  of  law  (Kelsen,  [1960]  2009:  203-205).  According  to  this  distinction,  a  legal 
system is dynamic when the validity of the rules is only based on a presupposed rule, which 
establishes the obligation to behave in accordance with the orders of the legal authority or  
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with customarily produced rules. This rule can only provide the foundation of validity, but not 
the valid content, of the rules based on it (Kelsen, [1960] 2009: 204). In this way, the matter 
of having to resort to rules outside the positive legal system to base its validity is avoided. The 
content of the basic foundational rule would only refer to whom has the authority to make 
valid legal norms. In contrast, a legal system is static when there is a basic foundational rule 
that provides both the basis of validity and the valid content of the rules inferred from it by a 
logical deduction (Kelsen, [1960] 2009: 203).  
 
Non-positivism, as a deductive science, would defend a static view of the legal systems. 
For  this  conception,  is  the  content  of  the  foundational  rule  what  gives  validity  to  itself, 
validity that transmits to the derived rules. In order not to be dependent of the validity of 
another norm, the validity of the basic foundational rule must be accepted as evident itself. To 
this conception, the validity of the rules that belong to a positive legal system depends on the 
adequacy of its contents to that basic foundational rule, which is external to that system. And 
only if its content does not depend on the subjectivity of any fellow, its can be able to be 
evident to anyone; in that sense, its content is objective. Correspondingly, the authority of 
those who make positive legal norms depends on the authority of another entity, external and 
hierarchically superior to them. The authority of the law maker lies, if in anything, in their 
ability to grasp intuitively the content of the basic foundational rule. Therefore, the capacity to 
produce norms by the law maker is not unlimited, but constrained by the duty to adapt it to 
the content of the basic foundational rule (George, 1996). If they suffer transformations is, 
supposedly, to get closer to the ideal legal system. Once reached, it would stop to change: 
ideally, the trend is toward staticism.  
 
Scientific  theories  are  similar  to  static  normative  systems,  but  now  the  validity  of 
scientific laws depends on the adequacy of its contents to the empirical facts. This does not 
necessarily imply the denial of certain dynamism to the system of scientific laws. However, as 
in  the  non-positivism,  these  changes  are  explained  by  the  replacement  of  one  theory  by 
another which is more descriptive of the facts than the first one; therefore, content remains the 
criterion of validity and, in this sense, the theories do not lose their static nature. 
 
If it is admitted that scientific knowledge progresses towards the truth, implicitly it is 
stated  that  truth  is  not  achieved  yet.  Firstly,  these  gaps  do  not  affect  the  objectivity  of 
knowledge already held . Secondly, the most recent attempts in trying to substantiate the  
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validity  of  the  empirical  sciences  have  used  a  kind  of  knowledge  not  external  to  itself. 
Otherwise, it would imply having to validate, in turn, that knowledge which does not refer to 
any empirical fact, and to admit that there are more forms of objective knowledge and that 
those forms are axiologically superior. So, to debug the empirical sciences of any strange 
element, the characteristic criteria of validity of deductive or normative sciences must not be 
relied on. Nonetheless, the issue of scientific knowledge’s foundation has not been resolved 
yet. This has meant the replacement of the concept of “truth” by the less ambitious one of 
“certainty”.  But  it  is  precisely  this  weakness  that  becomes  the  very  foundation  of  its 
legitimacy: in opposition to supposed truths adduced from certain conceptions of deductive 
and/or normative sciences that refer to a metaphysical knowledge (eg., non-positivism), one 
scientific theory succeed another in an endless progression toward truth, unattainable in its 
entirety. The system is no longer based on an ultimate truth, but on the promise of an eternal 
progress, possible only through the empirical scientific knowledge (Lyotard, [1979] 1993).  
 
That  appeal  to  the  lack  of  foundation  to  validate  empirical  knowledge  has  two 
ambivalent consequences over the authority of the scientist and the expert. On the one hand, it 
is weakened, due to the necessity to admit that their knowledge is not fully true, opening the 
possibility of mistakes and criticisms. But, on the other hand, those possible mistakes are 
justified as a result, not of the lack of objectivity, but of gaps in knowledge. It deters potential 
external controls over science, which reaffirms its authority on the basis of the promises of 
progress in scientific knowledge, making good the claim that it is urgent to invest in research.  
 
From the typology of sciences set out above, it could seem that normative sciences are 
closely linked with the prescriptions found in legal norms, as that is its object of knowledge, 
while the empirical sciences, whose object of knowledge are the empirical facts, do not keep 
any relation with the normative sphere. But this is obviously false. It is possible to derive 
prescriptions from the knowledge of empirical sciences. Formally expressed, from descriptive 
statements that comply with the principle of causality: “if it is A, then it is B”, prescriptions 
can be extracted that correspond to the formula: “if X, then you have to (must not) Y”. The 
logic would be as follows: “A is the cause of the (no) production of the effect B, so if you (do 
not) want that B to occur, then you have to (must not) A”. Those prescriptions derived from 
scientific knowledge will be called “techno-scientific prescriptions”. It should be noted that 
the validity and, therefore, the duty to obey that prescription does not come from the duty of 
obedience to those who have created it (the expert), as stated by the basic foundational rule in  
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dynamic  legal  systems,  but  from  the  objectivity  of  scientific  knowledge  from  which  the 
prescription was derived . From there, you can draw a relevant distinction between the two 
kinds of static legal systems viewed. For non-positivism, the dual character (descriptive and 
normative) of the rules included in the legal system affects the whole legal system, from the 
basic foundational rule to all derived rules. In contrast, in the empirical sciences, this duality 
is only produced in techno-scientific prescriptions resulting from scientific laws, which, in 
itself, are strictly descriptive. 
 
Those  differences  approach  empirical  sciences  to  iuspositivism.  According  to 
iuspositivism, normative scientists do not intend to create new rules or change the existing 
ones, but only to describe them. In contrast, the law maker produces rules with the aim to suit 
social  reality  to  his  will  .  In  that  sense,  his  interest  lies  not  in  describing  reality,  but  in 
transforming it. Consequently, normative sentences are clearly distinguished from legal norms 
and, by extension, the normative scientist from the law maker. Similarly, the scientist should 
not intend to suit reality to his theories. However, the purpose the expert is to transform 
reality, in order to adjust it to his will. (That character is reflected in the first part of the 
formula set above: “if you (do not) want to B, then you have to (must not) A”). As in dynamic 
legal systems, scientific laws are distinguished from techno-scientific prescriptions and, in 
some way, the scientist from the expert.  
 
In certain sense, the law maker and the expert fall on voluntarism, due to the their will of 
prevail over reality. Voluntarism can be seen in the fact that goals and motivations that give 
reason of the acts of will are defined either by the law maker, or by the expert. In its formal 
structure, nor the rule of law, nor the techno-scientific prescription set the end to be pursued. 
In first place is determined what is wanted; and only after, an effective action to adequate 
reality to will is conducted. As seen below, the law maker and the expert differ in the means 
they employ to achieve their ends. 
 
The sovereigntist theory of Austin, for instance, has a distinctively voluntarist character. 
But it is not so in other cases. Kelsen seeks to purge every trace of voluntarism, an element 
that finds strange to a pure theory of law. Instead, the basic foundational rule is located on the 
top of the hierarchy of validity, but whose content remits to the duty of obedience to the rules 
produced by the law maker. The ends are excluded from the structure of the rule of law, those 
are irrelevant to a pure theory of law. Consistent with its position, the purpose can never be  
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the ground for validity, since this would mean to substantiate the legal system according to its 
content, falling into staticism. Similarly, and in connection with the above stated, the basis of 
validity of prescriptions dictated by the expert refers to a scientific law, and not to the ends 
that the expert could give to himself. 
 
Although  both  the  theory  of  Kelsen  and  the  common  view  conception  of  empirical 
science agree on holding an anti-voluntarist point of view of dynamic legal systems, there are 
also  important  differences.  In  Kelsen,  what  validates  the  basic  foundational  rule  is  the 
legislation procedure; in other words, what is validated are the acts of the will of the law 
maker, in principle, unlimited in content. Instead, what scientific law validates is the techno-
scientific prescription and, only indirectly, the expert who has promulgated it. The scientific 
law does not authorise any particular expert directly. This results in a substantial difference 
regarding the legitimacy of its authority to dictate prescriptions: while the law maker remits to 
an external rule, but which, in turn, refers to his will; in the case of the expert, the external 
and legitimatory rule does not go back again to the will of the expert. In that sense, the 
legitimacy  of  the  expert  would  find  a  solid  objective  base  on  which  to  sustain.  This  is 
reflected  in  the  distinct  articulation  of  the  different  principles  that  characterise  normative 
sciences and empirical sciences. While in the relation of imputation, the connection between 
the antecedent and the consequent is the result of the will of the law maker, in the case of the 
causal  relation,  that  connection  is  determined  by  an  objective  relationship  between  two 
empirical facts.  
 
Therefore, expert authority would derive from his obedience and submission to the laws 
of nature, but the very same act of submission would lead to his domination, not only of 
nature, but also of societies, under the promise to put nature at their service. Its authority 
would derive from an initial act of submission, its legitimacy from a final act of submission. 
The  iuspositivist  law  maker's  authority  and  legitimacy,  however,  intends  to  remit  to  its 
sovereign  will,  or  to  one  basic  foundational  rule  that  is  situated  solely  on  the  beginning 
(Lyotard, [1979] 1989: 23-24). But this foundation falters at one point: while the grant of 
validity to normative production would have been achieved, as well as the ability to argue the 
existence of a legal  duty of obedience (Ross, 1993: 19), the law maker's submission to the 
will of the governed would not have been guaranteed, thereby posing problems about its 
legitimacy. 
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3. On sanctions 
At least in most cases, the prescriptions are supported by the imposition of a sanction (either 
negative or positive). This is correct for both legal norms and techno-scientific prescriptions. 
In the case of legal rules, the sanction consists in what is set by the rule itself. To the extent 
that it is the product of the law maker's will, ultimately he is who has determined what facts or 
behaviours deserve a legal consequence, and in what it should consist. By contrast, in the case 
of default of a techno-scientific prescription, the sanction consists, as a common denominator, 
in the efficacy or inefficacy of the action in achieving the desired end (Bobbio, 1990: 261). 
Now, the determination of the sanction has not been stipulated by any act of will; in some 
sense, it could be said that it is the reality who "imposes" the sanction. In this subsection, I 
develop these basic ideas.  
 
Firstly, the grounds of legitimation of the imposition of sanctions in techno-scientific 
prescriptions  will  be  addressed.  The  separation  between  subject  and  object  in  scientific 
knowledge implies that reality is seen by the scientist as static and given, whose laws cannot 
be altered. As noted above, the scientist cannot expect that the objective laws governing the 
world will suit to his will. Thus, people's knowledge will be more or less objective, more or 
less close to the truth, depending to their will to adapt their beliefs to the scientific findings 
made, or to persist in their unfounded prejudices. Similar to scientific laws, prescriptions 
arising from them cannot be repealed by any act of will. They are permanently in force (at 
least until a new theory may replace them); in other words, its validity and efficacy does not 
depend  on  the  subjective  will  of  compliance  with  them.  This  gives  them  an  aura  of 
inevitability. 
 
But,  as  was  the  case  of  scientific  knowledge,  each  agent  (whether  companies, 
individuals, states, etc.) is free to decide comply or not with the prescriptions arising from 
scientific knowledge, to decide freely act in accordance with the principle of efficacy or with 
other principles . To the extent that it is an act of free choice, the agent must assume his 
responsibility for any consequence that may follow. On the other hand, the imposition of the 
sanction for its (in)observance is justified by its inevitability, as it is considered the logical 
and necessary consequence of a non-abolishable law, the scientific one. Formally, the above 
related could be expressed as follows. From the principle of the techno-scientific prescription: 
“if you want to B, then you have to A”, the next conclusion can be drawn: “if it is not A, then 
it is not (must not be) B”.  “It is not" is employed in the consequent to express the inevitability  
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of the no production of the effect (which does not depend on the subject, but on a causal 
relationship), but “must not be” is also used to express the fairness of the sanction, consisting 
in the no production of the expected result, for not having behave according to law. You can 
blame the world for being as it is, but also to yourself for not having acted in order to get fit. 
It is the result of this combination between the necessity that scientific laws express and 
human freedom (to decide whether or not get fit to reality), how the inevitable imposition of 
sanctions (positive or negative) is legitimated, in the case of techno-scientific prescriptions.  
 
There is one more question to be addressed before entering another issue: that of the 
exemption  from  liability  for  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  techno-scientific  prescription.  As 
already commented, techno-scientific prescriptions are an outgrowth of scientific knowledge. 
Given that access to scientific knowledge is universal or, if preferred, democratic, ignorance 
is considered, again, the result of a free choice. As mentioned above, people are free to decide 
whether  to  adapt  their  ideas  to  scientific  rationality,  or  to  keep  other  kind  of  beliefs.  In 
conclusion, ignorance do not exempt from liability. However, it might be replied that it is 
impossible to acquire all scientific knowledge. But in response to that objection, one may 
answer that that impossibility can be countered through the use of experts in matters about 
which one does not have an appropriate knowledge.  
 
I will now address the legitimating basis for the imposition of sanctions in  the legal 
norms. If  scientific theories were characterised by their staticism, for the iuspositivist law 
maker the reality is dynamic and transformable. The iuspositivist law maker must choose, 
among the whole possible worlds, which of them should prevail. In the case of the non-
positivist law maker, valid alternatives are limited by the content of natural law. But in both 
cases the expected result is that, due to the accomplishment with the law, society is ordered in 
a certain way. The anthropological presumption of law is that legal rules are aimed at free 
agents, namely, the ability to determine its conduct according to the norm or not, but also free 
to share or not the law maker’s worldview. 
 
In the case of legal norms, the relationships between the antecedent and the consequent 
were  linked  by  the  principle  of  imputation.  That  implied  that  the  consequent  did  not 
necessarily and inevitably follow the mere fulfilment of the antecedent. This is true both for 
non-positivism  (the  truth  and  justice  of  any  ideal  concept  do  not  imply  by  itself  the 
application of the sanction), and for iuspositivism (from the mere will of the law maker does  
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not necessarily follow the effective implementation of the sanction). A positive legal norm is 
not imposed by reality itself. That is why that connection, in the case of negative sanctions, 
must  be  ensured  through  the  threat  of  physical  violence  by  certain  authority.  This  is  the 
characteristic instrument of legal norms. All this means that the ability to impose negative 
sanctions depends on the effective coercive means available. So, the connection, in this case, 
is merely probabilistic. 
 
Contrary to what happens to techno-scientific prescriptions, neither iuspositivism, nor 
non-positivism attain to legitimate the content of prescriptions, the imposition of sanctions 
and the use of violence related to legal norms by themselves (Habermas, [1968] 2007: 69) . 
Both  forms  of  legitimacy  lack  the  force  that  the  ideological  discourse  of  necessity  and 
inevitability, characteristic of techno-scientific prescriptions, has .  
 
III. Technocracy within the rule of law  
Until now, some similarities and differences between techno-scientific prescriptions and legal 
norms  have  been  explained,  but  separately.  The  characteristics  of  the  prescriptions  and 
sanctions  have  been  analysed,  and,  from  there,  conclusions  about  the  basis  of  both  the 
prescription’s and the sanction’s legitimacy have been drawn. 
 
The  goal  now  is  to  investigate  how  both  normative  systems,  the  legal  one  and  that 
composed by the set of techno-scientific prescriptions, interact with each other in order to 
regulate social life. I leave aside the conflicts that occur within science between scientific 
communities, both among different disciplines, and within each field of knowledge.  
 
Techno-scientific prescriptions are also addressed to the law maker, who may decide to 
take them into account or not, when carrying out their legislative activity. But, what is the 
point in transposing the techno-scientific prescriptions into legal norms and in incorporating 
them to the legal system, especially considering the inevitability in the imposition of their 
sanctions? To answer the question I refer, first, to the brief historical introduction made at the 
beginning.  Given  the  profound  implications,  both  positive  and  negative,  that  scientific 
knowledge  has  over  society,  states  would  be  also  interested  in  making  use  of  scientific 
knowledge, in promoting its production, and in regulating the techno-scientific activity in 
order to manage its consequences (Grimm, [1991] 2006: 190-193).   
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That science and technology would be considered the engine of economic and social 
development signifies that efficacy is the new engine of the economy: the more efficacious a 
society is, the more competitive and the more economic progress; and efficacy is improved by 
developing  new  technologies  .  That  has  given  rise  to  what  has  become  known  as  the 
“technological  imperative”. This  imperative has two dimensions:  1) technologies must be 
developed and applied to ensure efficacy in achieving the various objectives pursued; here, 
efficacy is understood in its instrumental value; and 2) available resources for production 
and/or  distribution  of  goods  must  be  deployed  in  the  most  efficacious  way  to  achieve 
developing  the  most  efficacious  technologies  to  increase  competitiveness  and  economic 
growth. An economy is efficient when it reaches that distribution. In this case, efficiency is no 
longer a means to achieve certain given ends, but the criterion for choosing between goals 
(Weber, [1922] 1964: 47-48). Put it in another way: that the criterion for resource allocation is 
to choose the most efficient option means that efficiency itself has become the end (Fischer, 
1990: 24). 
 
There  is  still  the  next  issue  to  be  resolved:  if  techno-scientific  prescriptions  already 
include  the  threat  of  a  negative  sanction  for  breach,  what  need  is  there  to  support  that 
prescription  with  the  threat  of  another  sanction  granted  by  the  state  through  the  use  of 
physical coercion? Why to the promise of efficacy, or the threat of inefficacy, the promise or 
threat of other sanctions stipulated in legal norms is added? In those two above commented 
dimensions of the “technological imperative” , the state seeks to promote efficacy, as a social 
value essential for social and economic progress. The negative sanction to society as a whole 
for failing to comply with the technological imperative would be the economic and social 
backwardness. The state’s justification for the transposition of techno-scientific prescriptions 
(prescriptions which consisted precisely in how to be efficacious), as well as the anticipated 
imposition of sanctions  (positive or negative) lies on the intention of avoiding the inevitable 
negative  sanction  that  society  would  suffer  in  the  event  of  non-compliance  with  the 
technological  imperative  (Habermas,  [1968]  2007:  84-85).  Therefore,  the  objective  is  to 
promote the efficacy and efficiency among all social agents, including the state itself. 
 
Exposed the reasons adduced to justify the inclusion in the legal system of the techno-
scientific prescriptions, I put my attention to some problems that can arise. Legal rules and 
techno-scientific prescriptions may regulate the same issue. If that happens, it may raise an  
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adequacy or a contradiction  between them. In case of contradiction, there can be five possible 
scenarios:  
 
1. That the rule of law and the prescription still continue to be in force and, therefore, the 
contradiction remains. 
2. That the prescription is refuted and the one in replacement is contradictory with the 
legal norm, maintaining the contradiction.  
3.  That  the  legal  norm  is  repealed  and,  in  case  of  approval  of  a  new  rule,  there  is 
adequacy, thus ending the contradiction. 
4. That  the prescription is  refuted (its  refusal  would depend, according to  the above 
exposed, on the refutation of the theory or scientific law in which was based) and the one 
which would replace the previous one is not contradictory with the legal norm.  
5. That the legal norm in which the techno-scientific prescription has been implemented 
is repealed, thus ending the contradiction.  
 
Except in the last option, it does not matter whether the conflict takes place within the 
legal  system,  due  to  having  been  implemented  such  prescriptions,  or  between  normative 
systems: in this case, the relevant point is the possibility of transposition.  
 
If  contradiction  is  maintained  and  it  occurs  within  the  legal  system,  there  are  two 
possibilities:  1)  that  the  legal  norm  resulting  from  the  transposition  of  the  prescription 
prevails, or 2) that the other legal norm prevails. 
 
“Technocracy" can be defined in relation to the solution set as valid. Thus, technocracy 
would be a political system in which the ideal criterions for the solution of contradictions that 
arise  between  legal  norms  or  legal  systems  that  set  out  fundamental  rights  and  techno-
scientific prescriptions consists in the third and fourth options. Having been established the 
criteria of resolution of conflicts among types of knowledge, the best solution is to adapt the 
legal standard to the one conceived by policy makers as the best alternative. The necessity 
discourse emerges when, in order to justify the policies adopted, which are backed by the 
threat of possible imposition of negative sanctions, the presented as the best alternative (or the 
less bad) becomes in fact the only one.  
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The specific value that inspires the legal system in the rule of law is the human dignity. 
Historically,  the  legal  regulation  has  been  considered  the  essential  and  most  effective 
instrument for ensuring and promoting that specific purpose of the rule of law. In that sense, 
the recognition of a set of fundamental rights, that is, linked to human dignity, are the legal 
means that the law has generated to achieve that aim (Díaz, 2002) . Its foundation is not 
derived from any empirical fact, as in the case of techno-scientific prescriptions, but from a 
strictly normative ground. Suppose that the legal system includes legal norms that recognise 
those fundamental rights. Then, the “rule of law” could be defined as the way of organisation 
of the political power that only admits, as a criterion to resolve the antinomies that arise 
between legal norms that set out fundamental rights and techno-scientific prescriptions, the 
fourth option mentioned and, in case of maintenance of the contradiction, the second of the 
two possible options .  
 
That the essential and characteristic value of the rule of law is respect for human dignity 
does not mean that other purposes cannot (and should) concur in their legal systems, for 
example, the maintenance of order public, national security, economic growth, social peace, 
etc. Suppose that all these goals are valuable and legitimate. The means through which these 
ends  are to  be attained  may or may not  conflict  with  the respect  for fundamental  rights. 
Respect for fundamental rights clash with the pursuit of any of such purposes when their 
recognition  or  exercise  is  refused,  or  their  contents  and  scope  are  reduced,  or  are  used 
exclusively as a means of achieving other purposes different from that of respect for human 
dignity. The rule of law is defined by putting respect for human dignity above any other 
purpose.  
 
To justify the means employed that are incompatible with respect for fundamental rights, 
there  are  two  possible  ways  forward.  First,  it  can  be  justified  by  the  very  value  of  the 
objective pursued. In that case, that end is placed explicitly as a hierarchically superior value 
to human dignity. But this would be the same as denying the rule of law. But what matters in 
this paper is to analyse whether there is any way to justify such means that do not involve an 
categorical denial of their status as a rule of law. The second way goes in this track.  
 
Secondly, the justification may focus on the technical nature of the measure. In that case, 
the means employed are justified, but without having to state the axiological superiority of the 
objective pursued over the value of human dignity. There are two lines of argument. First, it  
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can be adduced that the means are used to achieve a relevant end which, in turn, is suitable 
and necessary to seek to guarantee the rule of law. In this case, the axiological superiority of 
human dignity would be formally recognised. The means employed would claim the benefits 
for the guarantee of fundamental rights, although, in fact, involve their violation. To solve this 
paradox between what it should be and what it is, techno-scientific prescriptions could be 
used to justify the absence of viable and/or effective alternatives compatible with the defence 
of  fundamental  rights,  and,  therefore,  the  necessity  and  appropriateness  of  the  means 
employed . Secondly, it is possible to justify the measures taken in the name of efficacy as a 
value in itself. I refer to was has been commented above about the technological imperative 
and efficiency. In conclusion, a political system is shown as technocratic when violations of 
fundamental rights are justified, not by the aim pursued, but by the appropriateness of the 
means based on techno-scientific prescriptions.  
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